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Abstract— Agriculture has a high number of fatalities com-
pared to other blue collar fields, additionally population de-
creasing in rural areas is resulting in decreased work force.
These issues have resulted in increased focus on improving
efficiency of and introducing autonomy in agriculture. Field
robots are an increasingly promising branch of robotics targeted
at full automation in agriculture. The safety aspect however is
rarely addressed in connection with safety standards, which
limits the real-world applicability. In this paper we present an
analysis of a vision pipeline in connection with functional-safety
standards, in order to propose solutions for how to ascertain
that the system operates as required. Based on the analysis we
demonstrate a simple mechanism for verifying that a vision
pipeline is functioning correctly, thus improving the safety in
the overall system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Agriculture is an overexposed field in relation to injuries
and fatalities, both in the EU [1] and USA [2]. This implies
that even in developed countries there is a significant problem
with safety. In addition to the safety issues, rural areas
in developing countries are losing inhabitants to the cities,
which decreases the labour forces and puts extra emphasis
on improving efficiency. This has given birth to the idea of
replacing human labour for field work. To this end outdoor
mobile robots are a solution. A subclass of mobile robots
is given by field robots, and refers to machinery applied
for outdoor tasks, e.g., in construction, forestry and agri-
culture [3], [4]. Undertaking the job of creating field robots
is however a large task, in part due to the many domains
that overlap within robotics, e.g., mechanical and software.
Additionally the dynamical environment in which a field
robot operates introduces additional strain on the robots, and
as result outdoor mobile robots fail up to 10 times more often
than other types of robots [5]. The issue with field robots
being more prone to failure has resulted in research within
software quality for robotics [6]. The same issue is present in
more mature domains, such as the avionics and automotive
domains, which adopted Model-Driven Engineering (MDE;
[7]). This adoption has led to utilizing of MDE in robotics
to improve development time and reliability, examples are
SmartSoft [8] and for computer vision Robot Perception
Specification Language (RPSL; [9]). These MDE approaches
are however not developed with a functional safety focus
and are therefore missing some important aspects to make
the robots trustworthy in relation to certification, and thereby
improving the safety in the agricultural industry. For robots
the vision domain is critical, this is also the case for many
other applications ranging from monitoring operation on
airfields [10] to real-time controlling of autonomous systems,
such as vehicles [11] and robotics [12]. Robotics is highly
dependent on computer vision to understand and react to
the environment. This dependability imposes high constrains
on the reliability of the software and the vision pipeline.
For computer vision systems the issues are pointed out by
Yang et al. “one is to identify an obstacle surrounding the
robot and the other it to determine the location of the
obstacle” [13]. For field robots to assist in field work, the
robots have to be safety certified so as to minimise the
liability (liability is addressed in [14]) of the producers.
Our goal is to investigate if it is possible to extend an
MDE approach such as RPSL to incorporate safety aspects.
Concretely we propose ideas of how to achieve sufficient
safety levels for the vision system in a field robot, and report
on preliminary experiments demonstrating the viability of the
proposed methods.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Functional safety standards only address human dangers,
e.g., ISO 26262 [15] and ISO 25119 [16]. This leaves
the designer and developer to categorise issues related to
harming the robot, e.g., untraversable ground and non-human
obstacles. Hedenberg et al. [17] use EN 1525 (driver-less
trucks [18]), and argue that the focus on humans is sound
based on Asimov’s “A robot may not injure a human-
being or, through inaction, allow a human-being to come
to harm”. This law is however much broader than the
standards, because a person can be hurt by colliding with an
object that indirectly harms people, or figuratively if material
damages resulting from a crash are high. The same issue
exists in European law: Loss can be both economic and
non-economic; it includes loss of income or profit, burdens
incurred and a reduction in the value of property; and also
physical pain and suffering and impairment of the quality of
life [14]. Overall this means that safety should be addressed
for the entire operation of the robot.
Standards such as ISO 25119 for agriculture [16], and
ISO 13482, for mobile robots [19], are important for the
overall functional safety of the system. Additionally IEC
61496 is important for the specific sensors [20] and lastly
ISO/DIS 18497 is an upcoming performance standard within
agriculture to quantify detection performances [21]. There
are many requirements to a computer vision system: it
has to be able to observe a large area; it must be fast,
reliable and robust; and it is constrained to function with
low computing resources because it normally has to run
on embedded hardware, and might furthermore have lower
priority than control and must not jam [12]. Standards within
software for field robots are used to a very limited extent
and not existing within computer vision [4]. This lack of
standard is a paradox since autonomous mobile robots rely
on robust sensing to react, without robustness the robot may
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“hallucinate” and respond inappropriately [22]. This issue
puts constraints not only on the software but also on the
hardware. As an example a RAW image has different degrees
of being “RAW” [23]. This difference in RAW can be
seen in different A/D converters, gains, and hardware image
optimizations. Because of this wide range input changes in
hardware can be problematic, it is therefore important for
functional safety to look at software safety verifications of
the pipeline, and to give assurance about the hardware and
thereby verifying inputs and outputs.
MDE in robotics is an area that receives significant
attention, such as research within control [24], vision [9]
and general robot model-driven development [8], [25]. All
the before-mentioned MDE methods describe safety issues,
however these issues are not addressed according to any stan-
dards. Instead focus has been on quality, as with Reichardt
et. al who as an example deter from using code generation to
improve transparency [6]. Nevertheless we see code gener-
ation as an improvement to reliability and the possibility of
lowering the demands for achieving certification, as is done
by Bensalem et. al. [26]. Bensalem et. al. guarantee safety
using code generation, it is however not done according to
any standard. There exists several attempts to extend well-
known MDE environments such as RoboML and SysML to
incorporate Failure Tree Analysis (FTA) and safety analysis
according to IEC 61508 [27].
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
A. Safety Requirements
To achieve any safety level a hazard analysis needs to be
created, often called a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA).
At the stage of creating a PHA the system configurations
is unknown, during the development the PHA becomes a
hazard and risk analysis (HRA), when the hazards are eval-
uate according to the standards functional safety index, e.g.,
Agricultural Performance Level (AgPL) or System Integrity
Level (SIL). Then, depending on the standard, either an
iteration over the risk assessment is done when the system
has been redesigned, or the assessment becomes the basis of
the system design and puts constraints on the system, e.g.,
redundancy as a hardware requirement.
Based on the introduction of field robots in an agricul-
tural setting, we propose to evaluate field robots within
ISO 25119, for agriculture and forestry [16]. For the eval-
uation of hazards we refer to ISO 13482, which is for
personal robots, but also covers “multiple passengers” or
“non-standing passengers” or “outdoor” or “uneven surfaces”
or “not slow” or “not lightweight” or “autonomous” (ISO
13482, Sect. 6.1.2.3, Person Carrier Robots, Type 3.2), which
covers field robots. Annex A in ISO 13482 [19] gives an
overview of hazards to be evaluated. We refer to the broader
system functionality from ISO 13482 specifically for type
3.2 field robot, Table I.
Note that if the field care robot is inherently unstable, PL
e is required. Moreover, the control system shall achieve PL
e, but this might not be achievable for sensing mechanisms.
In this case, the risks caused by systematic failure of sensors
TABLE I: Performance levels for field robot.
Safety functions of robots Type 3.2
Emergency Stop d
Protective Stop e
Limits to workspace(incl. forbidden area avoidance) e
safety-related speed control e
safety-related force control N/A
Hazardous collision avoidance e
Stability Control (incl. overload protection) d
shall be reduced as low as reasonably practicable. When
assessing functional safety, then the entire path for the
function needs to be the same level, e.g., sensor input to
control output. This means that the vision system, based on
Table I, would reach an e-level. This has implications both on
hardware redundancy and software development practices;
we assume that the hardware system can be acquired.
We hypothesize that since the requirements are on func-
tional safety and not on performance, then the algorithms are
not directly implicated by the safety level. Moreover, if the
detection algorithms perform as proposed in ISO 18497, and
are developed according to Misra [28] software development
practices, then it would be acceptable. The functional safety
requirements would therefore be addressed by developing
a system that can test and verify the functionality of the
functions, and thereby ensure that the algorithms and sensor
are functioning. This interpretation is also in-line with the
standard IEC 61496, inferred from the descriptions of the
different types of Electro-Sensitive Protective Equipment
(EPSE). The EPSE types addresses monitoring of the system
working condition, and ability to perform, e.g. response
time. Another point is based on the Note for Table I,
considering the sensors, it might be not achievable to get all
parts of the sensor certified, in this case the highest level
should be achieved. The essence of our interpretation of
implementing functional safety is that one must ensure that
all the preconditions for an action hold before that action
can be safely and correctly executed, similar to the notion
put forth by Rahimi et. al. [29].
We draw the following aspects on EPSE from IEC 61496:
Detection Zone, Detection capability, adjustment (failure to
danger not possible). These points needs to be addressed in
order to ascertain the functionality of the sensor. Specifically
for software it is stated that it should be developed in accor-
dance with IEC 61508-3 or ISO 13849. IEC 61508 covers all
machines, however forestry and agricultural machinery has
ISO 25119 which is a type C standard, i.e., shall be used
within the covered machinery types. Therefore software for
our system should be developed according to ISO 25119,
supporting our prior commitment to this standard.
IV. PROPOSAL AND EXPERIMENTS
A. Proposal
Based on the discussed safety and the scenario overview,
we propose a systematic MDE-based approach to introduc-
ing safety in a vision pipeline. As an example, we use
a simple vision pipeline that generates a 3D point cloud
from two RAW images. The pipeline uses a debayer filter
Fig. 1: Approximated object diagram of the software pipeline following the structure of RPSL.
to convert the RAW images into grayscale images, they
are then rectified and undistorted using camera calibration
information, to enable the creation of disparity maps. Finally
the disparity maps are converted to a 3D point cloud. The
pipeline is described as a UML model using metamodels
from RPSL [9], the model is shown in Fig. 1. We would
in this pipeline hypothesize that it is possible to achieve a
higher safety level by using an extended version of RPSL that
has the ability to annotate the model with safety and validity
requirements. These annotations would be used to generate
code that continuously checks the integrity and correctness
of the vision pipeline. A camera is a sensor influenced by
many factors, lenses, processors and software, so the safety
functions should therefore not only address software errors
but also both mechanical and hardware errors.
Concretely, we propose two simple methods of improving
knowledge about faulty cases and verifying the functionality
of the system, by introducing declarative rules that specify
the behavior of the pipeline according to: histograms of
grayscale images and known landmark recognition. The rules
should be introduced in a simple way by using a domain-
specific language (DSL). A DSL would give flexibility to
the user, meanwhile using code generation it would provide
high reliability in the safety functions. The two methods
introduced above would contribute to knowledge about the
working condition of the software pipeline and the verifica-
tion of the input and the working condition of the camera.
The histogram analysis could give a description of how
much of the intensity spectrum is used and how large a
spread exists between the different intensity values. This in-
formation would supply basic information about the sensor’s
working condition and if the lens is covered (in that case
most pixels would have a very low intensity). The proposed
rule DSL could express the histogram concepts as follows:
h=Bayer2Mono_Left.output.histogram;
length(nonempty(h.bins))/length(h.bins)>0.1;
max(h)-min(h)>1000p;
The rule extracts a greyscale histogram of the specific
cameras image, i.e. Camera Left (more precisely the bayer
filtering result based on an image from Camera Left) . The
found histogram consists of bins representing the number of
pixels for each tonal value. The division gives the ratio of
bins with at least one pixel. The rule imposes that 10 percent
of the bins should be filled to make the image trustworthy.
This rule could also be used directly on the RAW image
from “Camera Left” filtering in Fig. 1. This would allow to
separate the verification process between camera problems
and processing errors. Since the RAW image approach would
require a more complicated technical description we stayed
with the grayscale case here since we believe that this gives
the reader a better understanding.
The second idea is to introduce a known landmark in a
defined area of the real world that the camera observes. This
known landmark would then result in some 3D points in a
defined area. If the points are not found in that region, then
there is an error in the vision pipeline, and the results from
the system cannot be trusted. Again the proposed rule DSL
could introduce this check by the following rules:
length(PointCloud_3D.output.
inArea(Camera_Left_Landmark))>900;
The rule uses the resulting point cloud of the vision pipeline,
Figure 1. The rule uses the output and extracts the points
from a specific area, in this case Camera Left Landmark.
The rule then specifies that at least 901 3D points should
be found in this area. Since it is known that the landmark
should exist in the specified area the rule would verify the
functionality of the functions and focus of the lens.
B. Experimental Setup and Results
Our experimental setup consists of a camera with CAN
and USB interface. The camera is a CLAAS Cam Pilot
stereo camera [30]. The interface to the camera uses CLAAS
hardware to convert USB signal to messages for controlling
the camera. The raw pictures are extracted using the USB
interface to the camera and enables easy analysis on a PC.
The above rules were implemented by hand in the vision
pipeline (Fig. 1). The simple function of analysing his-
tograms of the raw pictures has made it possible to ascertain
that the input falls within expected ranges. Which made
it possible to catch cases such as (a) and (b) shown on
Figure 2. As an example, the software is able to prompt
an error message, and will not let the system continue with
the analysis of the images. This error prompt could be used
in field robots in the decision module to stop the robot from
moving, and signalling an operator to come and solve the
issue. The landmark that was introduced was a white square
surface with a black cross in the lower part of the field of
view of the camera. This enabled a test of the entire software
pipeline, by evaluating the output of the 3D point cloud
to have a result in the expected area. If the landmark is
not detected the system will give an error of the lens and
software pipeline, giving a higher reliability. This was quite
robust, nevertheless it was possible to create scenarios where
the results were trusted wrongly, as with the case for the
(a) Left lens, covered. (b) right lens, overexposed.
(c) Left lens, partial cover (d) right lens, partial cover
Fig. 2: Sample images taken with Cam Pilot camera with
introduction of different faults.
pictures (c) and (d) on Figure 2. In this case neither of the
rules caught the fault. We however believe that extending
the histogram to look at distributions may have a change of
catching issues of partially covered lenses. The results verify
that the functionality of the camera can be improved with
simple rules. However extensions to the rules are needed,
such as the proposal for looking at distributions of exposures,
perhaps extended to the entire colour range.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has introduced concepts and ideas of how to
improve safety in relation to standards. The idea was based
on the notion of splitting the performance and functionality
requirements of the system and thereby minimizing certifi-
cation requirements of a sensor system. Our implementation
and tests gives an indication that our approach to annotate
safety requirements in a vision pipeline leads to improved
safety. In terms of future work, this is a first step toward
introducing safety certification within vision systems for field
robots. To further investigate the concept and validity of the
approach, we are currently discussing it with certification
authorities to understand the extend of the safety needed.
Our safety concept could be extended by introducing an
“imaginary cage”. The idea is to make the system trustworthy
enough that the cameras could make a perimeter around the
robot, which for example could be calculated on the basis of
the approach suggested by Ta¨ubig et. al. [31].
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